






INCLUSIVE EDUCATION AND EPISTEMIC 
VALUE IN THE PRAXIS OF ETHICAL 
CHANGE 
Ignace Haaz 
“How did we learn this word (“good” for instance)?  
From what sort of examples? In what language-games?  
Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.” 
(L. Wittgenstein, 1953, §77326) 
12.1 Inclusive Education 
12.1.1 Epistemic Value, Ethics and Online Learning 
In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisa-
tions, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational educa-
tion that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one 
would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows 
on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, 
which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing one-
self for a career. We see that knowledge comes also across disciplines, 
                                                          
326 Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2010): Philosophical Investigations, Transl. G. 
E. M. Anscombe, 4th revised Ed. by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
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which can enrich academic education. Vocational and university educa-
tion could agree on the fact that we all are lifelong learners, a concept 
that could be streamlined into institutional education models, where 
technical and pragmatic views would be assessed327. There is not much 
focus however on how everyday life could be made a fertile ground for 
education. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclu-
sion as the very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which 
in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as 
from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curricu-
lum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theo-
retically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted 
into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method 
and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values 
should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a 
more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising 
idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as 
it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across 
disciplines, times and contexts – and that university learns from being 
inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical 
education but also a wider view on the human being.  
“Epistemic values” simply mean that knowledge and truth should 
have a value. In order to fulfil the mission of an education institution, we 
should commit to the ideal of knowledge transmission realiter, not only 
as a consequence of our practice of teacher, editor or librarian. It is not 
enough to practically agree on the argument that human rights (SDGs) 
and communities are good solutions to unethical problems of exclusion 
and mismanagement (religious communities, academic communities are 
of course important elements). Academia and information science dif-
                                                          
327 Lucas, Bill, Spencer, Ellen and Claxton, Guy (2012): How to Teach Voca-
tional Education: A Theory of Vocational Pedagogy, Centre for Real-World 
Learning, University of Winchester, The City and Guilds of London Institute. 
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fers from various other professional fields in that knowledge and truth 
have a particular value for any person or group part of these environ-
ments or stakeholder in education. To move on the line of building 
communities is important, in particular for an online platforms based on 
internet (this is the case for institutions based on distance learning meth-
ods, for networks of teachers and students, for higher education admin-
istration distance learning and ToTs, and in open and distance learning 
in general). To build online open and distance communities gives a ra-
ther practical solution to an ethical need which is always as well a theo-
retical question328. 
Ethics and inclusive education should not be reduced to the action 
level of practical possibilities, just because these notions serve to make 
ethics understandable to all. A balance between theory and practice 
should always be considered. In this chapter we shall express the view 
that theoretical levels of ethical understandings focusing on ethics, edu-
cation and research help inclusion of others in education institutions, far 
from the view that theory is a field which should be left to the attention 
of some eccentrics living in ivory towers.  
By the means of theoretical understanding of ethics as in metaethics, 
epistemology, history of science and information science, we are also 
accepting that ethics might entail a plurality of views, as well as the 
richness of a common sense understanding of some widely shared 
standards of ethics across cultures and historical times.  
If we can ground ethics on some shared values it is also because any 
human being should be recognized some basic rights for education.  
                                                          
328 See the commented survey on ODL: Zawacki-Richter, Olaf and Qayyum, 
Adnan (2019): Open and Distance Education in Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, Springer-Briefs in Open and Distance Education, https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/978-981-13-5787-9_1 
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12.1.2 Inclusive Education in Practice: An Introduction 
12.1.2.1 Facts of Special Needs in Education 
Inclusive education defined as special education has a specific aim 
and a set of means to adapt an education structure to the individual 
needs of some students with special needs329. The purpose of special 
education is providing specialized services to students with disabilities 
so that they can develop and overcome their difficulties, in some cases 
that they succeed academically330. Different roles in the education sector 
are concerned by delivering this service. 
 The assistance of a behaviour specialist for younger students as 
children with emotional disabilities and mental health disorders is part 
of inclusive education. Early intervention enables an educator to work 
with children from birth to kindergarten to support important skills de-
velopment. Education institution employees do not actually diagnose 
behavioural or cognitive delays, medical professionals must do that, but 
they look at indicators that draw relations between cognitive deficits and 
educational concerns. Para educators are instructional assistant, integral 
part of the educational team because they provide the support a teacher, 
but are not responsible for learning that takes place. Special education 
administrators and coordinators, take leading roles in decision-making 
and in facilitating the right outcomes for students with special needs, by 
directing and overseeing the whole team of education related staff. Spe-
cial education teachers serve both as a teacher and as an advocate for 
                                                          
329 Ignace Haaz received a Doctorat ès Lettres from the University of Geneva 
and was Doctor Assistant at the Department of Philosophy of the University of 
Fribourg (Switzerland). Since 2013, he has contributed to release over 190 
books on ethics and theology as Globethics.net Publications Manager and is also 
active as Globethics.net online Ethics Library Programme Executive.  
330 Special Education Guide, 2019, https://www.specialeducationguide.com 
Inclusive Education and Epistemic Value 263 
 
students with special needs, juggling with responsibilities related indi-
vidualized education programs for those in special need331.  
12.1.2.2 Sociological Framework of Inclusion and the Ethical Principle 
of Inclusiveness 
As special education it can be derived from a general will to give 
equal rights to all in terms of education, including handicapped persons 
who should also have the right for education. Inclusive education is also 
to do with the evolution of the role of parents, who are more closely 
involved with the education of their children or young adult relatives. 
Family life is not only impacted by the needs and limitations of young 
persons with disabilities, it is as well under pressure of assessing the 
precise utility and contextual progress of psychological care and contin-
uing impact on education, while continuing to live a normal relationship 
with the person who should never be reduced to a patient or to the socio-
logical facts of special needs332. 
In a more general sense, inclusiveness (as opposed to exclusion, seg-
regation, or even integration) can be understood as adopting proactive 
measures that eliminate the barriers which hinder the learning and the 
full participation of students. Inclusion should transform the teacher’s 
and institution’s method of education and adapt to the individual needs 
of persons not only with disabilities (Gavira & Moriña, 2015). Inclu-
siveness should also be a way to ethically reform education institutions 
to be more truthful to their mission of delivering a decent education for 
all.  
                                                          
331 Special Education Guide, Ibid. 
332 Éric Plaisance, « Débats, échanges autour de l'éducation inclusive dans le 
monde », La nouvelle revue de l'adaptation et de la scolarisation 2013/2 (N° 
62), pp. 183-186. Rosario López Gavira & Anabel Moriña (2015) “Hidden voic-
es in higher education: inclusive policies and practices in social science and law 
classrooms”, International Journal of Inclusive Education, 19:4, 365-378 
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Figure: Source: Robert Aehnelt (2013): Historische Schritte auf dem Weg  
zur Inklusion auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene 
Descriptive efforts should be made by anthropologists, linguists,  
digital media experts and philosophers to show the highly attractive na-
ture of inclusive education, not because of some dogmatic arbitrary 
choice but because inclusiveness is in conflict with our subjective notion 
of values. Across disciplines all should explain and communicate how 
ethics is practised, but also be aware about how ethics is related to theo-
ry on a metaethical level.  
In practice we all observe that there are involuntary habits which im-
pact our lives but that are passively experienced, as first order short term 
desires, and beyond our long term conscious control (such as phobia, 
obsessions, compulsive disorders). Therapeutic care can be used to heal 
and revive capacities restricted by physiological mechanical or psycho-
logical causal constraints. If a child or a young adult is not given precise 
limits in the use of the internet, he or she may develop behaviour-
al/mental health disorders, such as computer addiction and insomnia. 
In order to promote health and education behavioural change and 
empowerment are needed, the first targeting individual or group behav-
iours through information incentives and manipulations, it is an easy 
way to change short term or first order desires, but is of no use for the 
development of personal autonomy and risks to induce other health and 
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education inequalities333. Empowerment on the contrary needs longer to 
realize because it is not a top-down but collaborative approach, but the 
change induced is respecting personal autonomy, and has long term ef-
fects. In order to be collaborative approaches, health and education 
measures should be primarily considered by decision related experienc-
es, even though some changes in life are not chosen but nudged into 
some kind of behaviour. Changing behaviour as empowerment can be 
related semantically to the notion of inclusive and collaborative learning 
to change our attitudes in various types of interactions, interrelations, 
reciprocity based attitudes, religion related mutuality, in opposition to a 
“behaviour-change approach” which wants “to influence (other) people 
to change their health-related behaviour, be it to stop smoking, eat less, 
eat better, exercise more”, etc. (Tengland, ibid.). At best change as em-
powerment should be part of mutual attentions and care in collaboration 
but this is only the practice based common ground.  
Ethical philosophy shed some light on how inclusion and inclusive-
ness in education could/should be seen as central focus of ethical refor-
mation or change334. In particular we would like to address the question 
to what extent knowledge has a value that brings change in our life as 
                                                          
333 We think at social marketing techniques and sophisticated technics of nudg-
ing people into certain kinds of behaviour. See as example: Tengland, Per-
Anders. (2012) Behavior Change or Empowerment: On the Ethics of Health-
Promotion Strategies, Public Health Ethics, 5, 140-153, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1093/phe/phs022  
334 In The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education (Ignace Haaz, 
2019), I have attempted to show from a philosophical historical point of view 
how the values of good education are interrelated to generous and inclusive edu-
cation, which has a long history. Introducing an ethics of generosity can help 
prevent unexpected catalysts for discrimination and oppression. This book in-
vites the reader to rediscover the Cartesian system of virtues focused on the 
central virtue of generosity, as key paradigm of inclusive education. Download 
for free from: www.globethics.net/philosophy-series 
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such, without focusing here on the question about how self-knowledge 
and knowledge can be achieved at the same time. 
The ethics of inclusive share of esteem across cultures and bounda-
ries remain a powerful counter reaction to the movements of groups 
driven by polarizing sociological mechanisms, which generate division 
and reproduce factual inequalities. Education is revolutionary in the 
sense that educators tend to firmly believe that we can discipline our-
selves to follow ethical guides, in order to dismantle barriers that are 
being formed by difference.  
In order to understand inclusion as related to the values of 
knowledge and truth, we need to present a concept of change, as a sim-
ple and not contradictory practice. With an appropriate notion of self-
esteem and esteem of others, and with a strong concept of truth and what 
we call the ethical change or reformation, we can fulfil the main condi-
tions for dialogue with others and inclusion of others, tolerating some 
disruptive attitudes, because our compass is fixed on solid ground. The 
right attitude is not complacency toward others, nor is it an unjustified 
desire to please others. I shall attempt to sketch out some basic ingredi-
ents of what an “ethical reformation of values” can mean, and we will 
argue that change is best assured when knowledge is granted. 
12.2 Ethical Change Understood Philosophically 
If we listen to media campaigns we are told on daily basis to em-
brace disruption in our behaviour, or collectively on the level of policies, 
and change early and at any price. In order to have some dialogical and 
second order desire based foundation of empowerment and change, let’s 
try to unfold the complex process of how change enters our mental life, 
by reflecting on movements and practices and try to show how trans-
formation is widely present in our life:   
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12.2.1 Potentiality in Action  
Philosophical ethics is not only related to the arena of intentional re-
flection. It is not solely reflective, conscious deliberation that leads us to 
live our values but also that which brings what exists as human potenti-
ality, which is virtual, into actuality as an active experimentation 
(Greek: energeia as opposed to dynamis) 335. Potentiality in action 
means either a reflective conversations (e. g. between professionals) or 
as a smoothly incorporated collective practise in any type of social activ-
ity. Consciously transmitted values in a process of experimentation and 
actualisation are open to change and revision. 
12.2.2 Humans are Relational Beings 
 Homo sapiens gained an advantage over more dopamine addicted 
cousins by having a low “neanderthal quotient336”. In other words, we as 
humans survived, even before inventing an elaborate language, religious 
gatherings and great economic collaborations, through simple social 
ability and willingness to live in groups. Humans are beings whose iden-
tity is formed in relationship to the beings around them. In the practice 
of good relationships, the care of one’s self can also be seen as a pre-
condition for being able to care for others. Good relationships depend on 
collective expression in practice but also on a minimal security of our 
private sphere.  
12.2.3 Esteem and Empowerment  
Self-esteem and esteem-of others can afford some degree of ethical 
reformation and change: it is the price of a humanistic and pluralistic 
view on values, and a constructive dialectic between power oriented and 
                                                          
335 I leave open the metaphysical structure of our setting; I refer to a basic con-
cept, that of Energeia, given by Aristotle and interpreted it in a personal way. 
336 Geher, Glenn, Holler, Richard, Chapleau, David et alii, “Using Personal 
Genome Technology and Psychometrics to Study the Personality of the Nean-
derthals”, Human Ethology Bulletin 32 (2017)3: 34-46. 
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service oriented ethics of leadership337. As long as we acknowledge ei-
ther a wide set of inherent values, or one core humanity grounded value, 
and we do so precisely and value refined values consequently among 
peers, adapting to given geographical contexts, we are dealing with 
strong values, quite on the opposite of complacency and resignation 
which are rooted in impotence, and cannot be embedded in shared es-
teem. Excessive limitations in potential/competence cannot afford any 
change or revision of values.  
Complacency occurs if we depreciate our self-esteem (individually 
or collectively); by willing to please others at an unaffordable cost vis-à-
vis some essential potential and shared values. Ethical change should go 
away from complacency toward initiative and empowerment.  
12.2.4 Contempt for the Pain instead of Blaming 
How should we answer to wrong actions in a fairly inclusive way? 
Answering by contempt instead of by blaming to a wrong differs from 
seeking to correct a wrong at any price, but seeking instead to empower 
by showing the right example. Blaming is related to the hope that the 
perpetrators of wrongful actions can see their guilt and recognize and 
experience it as wrong. “Praise and punishment can correct and effec-
tively control behaviour when it affects people who are concerned not 
only with their reputation, but also with self-esteem. Moral censure pro-
duces a moral shock: feelings of guilt, failure and defiance. Blame gen-
erates displeasure and should therefore often be omitted, even if it might 
be appropriate. Some blame remains silent blame and should remain 
so.” (Wolf, Haaz, 2011). Blaming is a poor method of amelioration or 
facilitation of virtuous action, mainly based on a rights based retributive 
principle which evaluates the complex interrelations of various rights, it 
                                                          
337 See my definition of ethical pluralism, as opposed to ethical relativism, Haaz 
(2019), op. cit., in particular Ch. 2 “Leadership, Anti-realism and moral psy-
chology”. 
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is as using “the power of Beelzebub to force out demons” (Matthew 
12.24). Answering to wrongs by contempt (as mépris for Descartes) is 
very different, it takes the value of moral sentiments seriously but 
doesn’t cultivate the hope of changing behaviour by proactive moral 
shocks; mépris can and should remain as silent as possible in order to 
not add more pain and suffering in the world338. Contempt should not be 
understood in the popular sense of stigmatisation but on the contrary, it 
is writing off a wrong as negligible—“e.g. a hero could be said to have 
‘contempt for the pain of his wounds”339. 
12.2.5 Digital Disruption  
Economy, commerce, administration, communication, our work and 
even our presence —the beginning, the origin, or the active constitution 
of the self and values— are increasingly digital. It is indeed a chaotic 
change but also an invitation for creativity in the age of digital disrup-
tion. Increasingly, we are including technology in our interactions; 
therefore we should speak of techno-moral care and change. Indeed we 
allocate differently our time and energy since the emergence of a new 
phenomenon: the development of digital technologies, a paradigm shift 
as revolutionary as the Gutenberg’s printing press340. 
                                                          
338 Wolf, Jean-Claude, Haaz, Ignace, Strafe als Tadel? Argumente pro und kont-
ra in: Von Hirsch, A., Neumann, U. and Seelmann, K. (Hrsg.), Strafe - Warum? 
Gegenwärtige Strafbegründungen im Lichte von Hegels Straftheorie, 2011, 69-
78. 
339 Descartes, René (1649/2010): Passions of the Soul, Transl. and Glossary by 
Jonathan Bennett. See Glossary: “Contempt”. 
340 I owe this § to Christian Grund Sørensen’s bright insights (“Church and 
Neighbour in an Age of Artificial Intelligence and Disruption”, Report, un-
published, May 2019), for convincing me on the relevance of digital disruption 
as not only as quantitative modality of an augmented reality or presence, but as 
a paradigm shift in the sense of T. Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
1962) a paradigm shift occurs when “the dominant paradigm under which nor-
mal science operates is rendered incompatible with new phenomena”.  
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12.2.5.1 Digital Disruption as a Democratisation Process  
The use of internet to express the voice of the majority, relates to the 
participation opportunities in social life, whereby new digital platforms 
provide new opportunities for online activism. E-activism, e-petition, e-
citizenship, e-government, e-voting are promising aspects of the inter-
net, having more technical capacity to interact. Do we have more time 
and an augmented organisation capacity needed to make the best use out 
of it? Our capacity of communication has in reality been limited by cen-
sorship, our freedom is limited by more surveillance, propaganda and 
manipulation 
12.2.5.2 Internet Epistemic Risks  
In order to be inclusive in an efficient way, we need to get rid of the 
hyper-optimistic “technological solutionism” and focus on values 
adapted for internet literate persons, in particular when crisp clear 
knowledge transmission is a professional duty as for educators and in-
formation professionals 341. There are many deep social and economic 
inequalities that have not been solved, such as the generation and social 
gap. To address these issues more effectively with the help of infor-
mation technology, I propose to focus on five important epistemic risks 
inherent of the use of internet, which may prevent a constructive change 
and the empowerment of others when we navigate on the internet. Using 
internet is complex to the point of labyrinthine once we do an advanced 
search, it is easy to be walking around and not finding what we are look-
ing for.  
(a) Filter bubbles are not only useful tools where search engines and 
their algorithms track information in our browser history to increase the 
usability of our environment on internet (including, for example, the 
place where we have been), but it can also produce a state of intellectual 
                                                          
341 Hidalgo, Olivier (2019): Demokratie und Digitalisierung, Information Philo-
sophie, März 2019, 52-58. 
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isolation built on our personalized searches. We can easily find our-
selves “in a mirror chamber with a narrower and narrower experience of 
the world.” (Lanier, 2016). If both John and Paul search “virtue” they 
don't come up with same results as Google has a database of one’s pre-
viously used search terms and visited web pages, resulting in a specific 
informational profile which is unique for each user (Heersmink, 2018). 
(b) Bias due to personalised ranking of search results consist in an 
imprecise ranking, from knowledge value point of view, determined in 
relation to a network of other websites. Just because many hyperlinks 
point towards a website, it is no guarantee that it contains epistemically 
useful or accurate information.  
(c) Studies showing students implicitly trust Google’s ranking of ed-
ucational content in that they prefer to click on links in higher positions 
even when the abstracts are less relevant.  
(d) Autocompleted search terms nudging towards a wrong path of 
enquiry (Google autocomplete based on search history with trending 
popular searches cannot be turned off, only ignored). A good case study 
of this bias is to search for “What happened to the dinosaurs?” which 
brings some epistemically wrong results at high Google ranking levels. 
(e) Difficulty of verifying the validity of the source of information 
on blogs, social media and internet forums posted by anonymous non-
experts342. 
With regard to inclusiveness, a person who has bad cognitive habits, 
because he/she does not develop much his/her ideas in complete argu-
ments, relying more on a short-term memory than clear reasoning, or a 
person who has learning difficulties, or who does not speak a language 
well, will have additional cognitive difficulties to escape the technical 
daedal of how engines and navigators function.  
                                                          
342 Heersmink, Richard (2018): A Virtue Epistemology of the Internet: Search 
Engines, Intellectual Virtues and Education, Social Epistemology, Vol. 32, No. 
1, 1–2. 
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An important part of the solution depends on the dispositions and at-
titudes of the person (his/her ethical character) vis-à-vis various methods 
of acquisition and transmission of knowledge (epistemology) and which 
can be defined by intellectual virtues: virtues a person of knowledge. 
12.2.5.3 Internet Virtues as Epistemic Virtues 
Intellectual virtues can be divided into two sets of virtues, and cor-
relatively with what Heersmink calls internet epistemic vices343 (ibid. 
2018, 3), or the absence of these positive dispositions: 
• Intellectual responsibility related virtues (curiosity, open-
mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness) 
Curiosity: being motivated to extend the horizon of knowledge 
Open-mindedness: willing to consider alternative views 
Attentiveness: to have a sustained focus when performing some cog-
nitive task 
Intellectual carefulness: logical skills and critical thinking skills 
• Intellectual reliability related virtues: (intellectual courage, 
humility, tenacity, intellectual thoroughness) 
Intellectual courage: to be prepared to be embarrassed, eventually 
accept some risks related to founded knowledge 
Intellectual humility: to be realistic on own limitation of reasoning 
skills, and mistakes to which one is prone 
Intellectual tenacity and thoroughness:  not to give up quickly when 
one doesn’t understand something, to probe for deeper meaning, 
                                                          
343 “Epistemic virtue” comes from the Greek epistēmē, which can refer to 
knowledge, science or understanding, and virtue which stands for moral excel-
lence. Epistemic virtue is a value committing to individual or collective great-
ness. As related to our understanding, virtues are also common good related or 
part of first principles of moral life. 
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draw connections instead of memorizing 
• Intellectual vices (apathy, dependence, arrogance, neglect, 
carelessness, intellectual conformity, indecisiveness) 
The opposite of curiosity is intellectual apathy 
The opposite of autonomy is dependence  
The opposite of humility is arrogance  
The opposite of attentiveness is neglect or inattention 
The opposite of carefulness is carelessness  
The opposite of open-mindedness is being dogmatic 
The opposite of intellectual courage is intellectual conformity 
The opposite of intellectual tenacity is indecisiveness 
12.2.5.4 Redefining Common Good Based Use of Internet  
 There are deontological ethical principles related to the use of inter-
net focusing on intentions (also called Golden Rule, reciprocity rule), 
more than concrete consequences and risks. The most important deonto-
logical principle is the categorical imperative, which based use of inter-
net would urge us to ask oneself a simple question: “Before a person 
does something with a technology, the person should reflect, whether it 
would be alright if everyone did it”. There is also a teleological ethical 
principle for internet focusing on aims and outcomes, rather than inten-
tions. The most important is the no harm principle “to ask oneself 
whether this internet product is going to harm or dehumanise anyone”. 
The third family of common good based principles is a consent based 
principles of artificial intelligence related technology. Informed consent 
condition of using AI would invite us to ask “whether we have the in-
formed consent of those who will be affected”. Privacy is part of a con-
sent related use of technology; it is about the right limits in establishing 
good relationships with others (teacher/student/clients/patients). Privacy 
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depends on the subjective and lived experiences of the value of privacy 
across contexts, not only on norms, definitions, rights and laws - which 
should be adapted (but are unlikely to prevent all risk).  
Common good based values and internet are all concerned by the 
ethical use of internet and artificial intelligence based on the principle of 
diversity for common good and benefit of humanity. It is part of the 
condition of diversity and of common sense understanding of humanity 
that inclusiveness is not left behind. For persons in need for inclusive 
education, the very condition of a principle of reciprocity, considered as 
a fundamental principle, might be problematic, justifying the need for 
external support to the teacher (or the librarian), but also information 
about how to handle similar situations in such a way to give individual 
attention and keep in mind that inclusion is most of the time about the 
spirit, not the space. Let’s try to define the right spirit of inclusiveness 
with regard to common practices. 
12.2.6 Inclusion and Practice 
A non-contradictory definition of a value or norm should always be 
seen as possible and subject of tacit consent (implying, therefore, logical 
non-contradiction). Definitions can be communicated and agreed upon 
among persons entering in good practice in order to strictly distinguish 
the definition of the norm and any interpretation of these norms, rules 
and practices. Changing a value can be understood as shifting, engineer-
ing, replacing, revising, improving, innovating, ameliorating or reform-
ing; they apply to the rule of practice (not to interpretations). In some 
cases, experimentation leads to active intervention which can be seen as 
transgression. Transgression is thus always norm relative; it is related to 
norms which have been previously established. 
Amelioration and facilitating is a change done by practice, i.e. by 
use: a new meaning has been made explicit in action, in a community of 
users and practitioners.  
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12.2.6.1 A Philosophy of Contradictions 
Inclusion and change can also be seen as a way of dealing with con-
flicts, a philosophy of contradictions or an affirmative and dynamical 
way of looking at the being and the reality as we read in Matthew 10:33: 
“Do not assume that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not 
come to bring peace, but a sword.” The leader and pacifying mind 
across conflicts, by being inclusive is “The thunderbolt pilots all things.” 
“The god is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger [all 
opposites, he is the nous]” a Heraclitus inspired hidden unity that binds 
all opposites. Inclusivity is “Grasping: wholes and not wholes, conver-
gent divergent, consonant dissonant, from all things one and from one 
thing all.” (D.K. 64, 67, 10344) 
While including others, the fact of intervention can disrupt the nor-
mal functioning of a process of development of values, or a system serv-
ing certain functions or values, and ultimately be considered as trans-
gression. Knowledge values, common good based values, and prefer-
ences don’t align as easily as we can see in the thought experiment be-
low. 
12.2.6.2 The Reformer’s Dilemma and Transgression and Rule of Prac-
tice Reformation 
Suppose A is an ethical social reformer and thinks that value v 
should mean v where v is not the value determined by the value conven-
tions of v’s community. If A uses w to mean v – i.e., speaks to and in-
terprets others as if w means v – then A has done something wrong qua 
member of his value community (supposing common values). Either A 
can interpret others correctly (according to conventional values) or A 
can reform the values, but A can’t do both.  
In his Philosophical Investigations, L. Wittgenstein brings a way out 
of this dilemma by showing that the correctness or incorrectness of a use 
                                                          
344 Diels, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, K. Freeman (transl.), Cam-
bridge: Harvard UP. 
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of language, which applies for other rule based practices, is determined 
by the rules of the language or of the given practice—“determined” in 
two senses which allow the transformation or inventive change of a 
practice: 
(a) The rules form a complete system, in the sense that for every 
“move” within the language it is obvious that a rule does or does not 
apply. 
(b) Where a rule does apply, it is obvious whether it has been fol-
lowed or infringed. 
(c) Where no existing rules apply, you can always adopt a new rule 
to cover the case, but then that obviously changes the game. 
A constructive and sustainable change is thus a change that is em-
bedded in such a way in a practice that it has been made possible in a 
reformed system of values, which is not simply interpreted by the com-
munity of practitioners as a form of transgression, and the game has 
changed around that overall praxis in a sense not affecting the applica-
tion of existing rules. Trust and transgression are mutually exclusive 
concepts; it is not possible to build on trust in any trade related ex-
change, or simply any relationship on love if the fear of hate, of being 
cheated, is predominant over confidence and predictability. Three main 
reasons to change rules are (1) Rules can be incomplete, therefore sub-
ject to modifications (§68), ( 2) the rule doesn’t exhaust the correctness 
of its applications in term of right or wrong, and (3) some rules doesn’t 
explain what playing the game constitutes345. Changing a practice as 
reforming a practice by contrast to consolidate without significant 
change differs from revolutionizing a practice which always entails a 
removal and replacement of major components of the practice. Reform-
ing a practice is based on the aim of bringing an amendment of what is 
defective or incomplete, without turning the whole system upside down. 
                                                          
345 Cavell, S. Must We Mean what We Say? A Book of Essays, Harvard: UP, 49. 
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12.2.6.3 Community of Practice as Institutional Form of Practice and 
Reformation of Practice 
Ethical reformation has as main tool for inclusion the institutional 
form of a community of practice. An activity which can be attributed to 
individuals, collectives (families, churches, societies) and institutions 
(private, public, State related) has a political advantage to multiply hori-
zontal interactions between communities of practice, in order to increase 
the outreach of each circle, provided overlapping interest and values. 
The more communities have an interest to promote progress and change, 
the more they are keen to be open. 
Institutional communities of practice are interconnected as solidarity 
is increasing with the use of technology. Global understanding is needed 
to deal with the most imaginative scenario of connections and connec-
tivity between sectors in our societies. 
Ethical reformation is often part of an education (scientific), religion, 
and/or legal and political discipline oriented practice. Institutions of ed-
ucation, religious communities, legal and human rights NGOs and polit-
ical drivers of change welcome reformation of values in their institu-
tions. Instead of relying only on their professional network, embracing 
strategically an ideal progress in well-being, human rights or essential 
human capacity based values means to stay open to social and human 
progress in various ways. Power relations are seen increasingly as 
shared capacities instead of concentration and accumulation of power.  
Various forms of work organisation (administration, management) 
are based on legal and proto-legal types of practice across many sectors 
of activities (professions, economic sectors). As such they should be 
based on the division of responsibilities in order to generate stronger 
impact; a form of organisation should never be merely “the rule of the 
anonymity”, which on the contrary is a risk, that of harming other capac-
ities, professional potentials of innovation. Horizontal organisational 
structures relying less on legal codes and hierarchy may be more flexible 
and thus open to change. Many different forms of activities around the 
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living being coexist. By balancing globally these formal conditions of 
our life we can invest harmoniously our life and develop with joy and 
the sentiment of a free horizon in front of us our potentials in a dynam-
ical way. When this dynamism is given, we have the sensation of being 
able to work and give our best; whether individual or collective. A col-
lective brings innovation when there is an industrial impact of the tech-
nology developed by this enterprise/work organization. Innovation is not 
a value expressed on the originality of the scientific findings, which log-
ically precedes, but which is often owned by multiple research stake-
holders, across different continents, in a complex way. 
By being actualized into an institutional form, a dynamic of change 
or reformation of values is not simply concerning an actual shape346. or 
the reproduction of a formal strategy of the organisation, or professional 
corporation interactions. Reforming an institution, or laying down a pro-
gressive dynamic at the core of the institution refers to a deep movement 
of transformation which brings some new values into action, based on 
the mission and values of the organisation347. In order to be inclusive, 
the change in value should be seen as a potential being, as philosophers 
after Aristotle would say which is something else, already, and therefor 
change dependant.  
                                                          
346 Chen, C. (1956): “Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philoso-
phy of Aristotle”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17(1), 56-65. 
doi:10.2307/2104687 
347 As inclusive activity value reformation is something that should become 
actual, passing from capacities and potentials as matter to be expressed and ul-
timately related to a given form, and thus be normative in the sense of applica-
tion to a form (Greek: energia as application to a form aidos). As example: the 
bronze is actually bronze, but it is in action “not in so far as it is bronze, but in 
so far as it is movable”. The community of practice constituted by institutions 
share this propriety of overcoming the matter and form antimomy by creating 
new potentials by the simple fact of the diversity and size of the institution.  
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12.2.6.4 Inclusion and Ecological Transition 
Care for the environment as qualitative design principle refers to an 
ethics of change as transformability in social-ecological systems. The 
terms “transformability” is to be understood as an energy transition re-
lated and defined as a long-term structural change (“ecological transi-
tion”). Inclusion as an education oriented aim should not only bring an 
openness of the self to others, but also to a non-anthropological world, 
to nature and to our responsibility towards environmental impact. As we 
rely on an open society model of organisation and economy, ecological 
awareness is again showing the importance of having the right 
knowledge at the right time. Unfortunately the more a situation is under-
stood as being urgent, the less theoretical and practical work is likely to 
complement harmoniously. When a majority of the population on earth 
is exposed to concrete risks of climate change, but without that some of 
the richest part of the world face the same risk, to the same extend, in-
clusiveness might be more difficult for rich countries because of the 
simple fact of their situation. 
12.2.6.5 The Problem of Drawing a Relation between Statements of 
Facts and Moral Judgements 
Philosophers call is-ought problem the category confusion inherent 
to the attempts of empirical or pragmatic foundation of ethical values on 
brute facts. On a purely prudential level prevention of risks can be done 
by facts assessment, as when police is blocking a road after an accident. 
In order to present the moral duty of a subject in a convincing way, we 
need more than a harm or a risk, we need wrongdoings i.e. intentions 
and liable, or responsible subjects. 
The Scottish philosopher D. Hume presented how the attempt of de-
riving moral belief and judgment from facts might occur, but should be 
handled with caution, showing how our use of the language can hide 
some ethical preconceptions. He shows a kind of allegoric shift between 
two levels of the discourse: first facts (natural phenomenon, tendencies, 
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first order desires) and second, the apparition of unexpected ethical no-
tions: 
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I 
have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in 
the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a 
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all 
of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copu-
lations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition 
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change 
is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirma-
tion, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and 
at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems al-
together inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from others, which are entirely different from it348.”  
The is-ought gap comes from possibly not seeing clearly the differ-
ence between facts as how people live and express values by looking at 
them, and the moral judgement which is grounded on a meta-ethical 
prescriptive ground. Hume would clearly derive values from passions, 
not reason, but T. Reid has denied the irrational or empirical ground 
proposed by the former, by affirming the need for ethical reason based 
first principles. Reid presents the utility of deontic statements and ex-
plains that there should be a logical difference between what should be 
done or not done, what must be done, or what must be forbidden, given 
some strong modalities of necessity or principles in the first place. This 
whole conversation remains valid when epistemic authority is not clear 
and communication about knowledge and values is not clear. 
                                                          
348 Hume, David (1739): A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I, “Of vir-
tue and vice in general”, Sect I. 
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In order to avoid the error of category between facts/norms, theo-
ry/practice based judgements, a clear ethical argumentation and reason-
ing needs to be prior available. There is stability across cultures and 
History on first (global ethical) principles of morals349. In order to des-
ignate actors as moral or non-moral, we need another type of reasoning 
than consequence based reasoning, argues Reid, who answers the scepti-
cal temptation of reducing the good to what is desirable, - showing the 
incapacity of desires and wills to account for moral subjects as they are 
limited to the evaluation of actions. 
In order to have an inclusive attitude towards others, one needs more 
than medical, ecological and socio-economic facts. Without reflecting 
morally on the subject, we are left with the desirability or undesirability 
of unequal circumstances of life, and lack the right attitude of including 
the other person, not because of moral sentiments, but because of the 
ground of a reason and moral principle.  
Ethical progress in areas open to strong moral dilemmas as those re-
lated to ecology (climate change) show the limits of action based inter-
pretation of human behaviour. In order to change the mind of those who 
remain sceptical we need the ground of a stable foundation, given by 
common sense practical morality; however, to be tempted to reducing all 
ethics to practical ethics is an abuse of language, it is forgetting the theo-
retical level of norms, where we easily tend to disagree, but knowledge 
authority is theoretical and disagreement is part of the theoretical devel-
opment of knowledge350.  
                                                          
349 This common sense judgment is “necessary to all men for their being and 
preservation, and therefore it is unconditionally given to all men by the Author 
of Nature”, Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Derek Brookes 
(ed.), University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 6.4, 452. 
350 Legal texts, aphoristic discourses, which are narrative but not argumentative 
or the preaching of values (as living practice in religious communities, as exam-
plarist virtue ethics in practice) fulfil some essential conditions to be value driv-
en ethical change drivers, but without argumentative authority, without the logi-
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In order to bring a large overlapping consensus over ecology related 
issues the academic professions need to be developing strong theoretical 
research and show the example by strong institutional presence in the 
civil society. 
12.2.6.6 Summum Bonum 
What ought to be should not simply be based on statements about 
what is, running the risk of missing the gap between facts and values. 
An argumentative discipline is required to sort out what behaviour is 
valuable (teleological), or even ethically the best, with regard to an ulti-
mate standard or summum bonum. To claim for a precise notion of a 
highest good, an end in itself or intrinsic value; brings immense ad-
vantages in order to construct an explicit and argument-based system of 
values. To be able to reform a practice following the main chapters of 
the given type of highest value that has been chosen, introduces parame-
ters of articulation of a system of values/principles. As the birth, the 
death, separation or illness are chapters of the human life, and are to 
some extent containing all the other goods or values of that life, any 
highest good (Greek energia as being perfect) supposes chap-
ters/parameters of a given hierarchy of values (or axiology), or definable 
stages of evolution (and possible regress). In priority summum bonum 
should be concerned by truth related systems of values in order to gain 
epistemic authority or a value of knowledge, objectivity and predictabil-
ity. 
                                                                                                                     
cal constructive skeleton of systematic thinking, the communication doesn’t 
bring a fundamental narrative of what ought to be. We miss realistic theoretical 
analysis when we rely on practical projection into a possibly common but ulti-
mately highly contingent configuration of the world. 
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12.3 Conclusion: The Value of the Epistemic Value 
A radical faith in people is important if we take seriously the idea 
that we are neighbours, and that we should carry the same interest in our 
neighbour as we do in ourselves, according to Jesus Christ (Mark, 12, 
31).  To improve policies and professionalism in higher education are 
good first steps but not sufficient in order to achieve real change in qual-
ity as it is not sufficient to be using the ingenious path of the cyberspace 
to achieve real change in quality, which should always be related to con-
ceptual clarity, truth and inventive argument based narratives. It is not 
enough either to be able to analyse the methods of knowledge; 
knowledge itself should remain the central scope of higher education 
development; otherwise communication would have a poor value, even 
if our intentions are praiseworthy.  
As living beings, we are placed in the world of nature, not only with 
regard to the environment, animals and the biodiversity but with regard 
to the billions of living beings who work unceasingly to maintain our 
collective body and identity. We may be tempted to forget this natural 
fact because we are part of a project of human community which gives a 
unifying form to our interactions and brings changes into our life and the 
world. We aim endlessly at becoming self-organizing living wholes, 
with many other humans, claiming ethically to pay a special attention to 
mutual differences, to include them with respect and care. It is a matter 
of constant ingenuity and careful observation of nature and of the human 
mind (including our possible justifications of the existence and descrip-
tion of the presence of a Divine power or world order). 
We are continuing to live in one world, but the world has different 
attributes, bodily and spiritually, thus bringing an epistemic (epistemic, 
method of knowledge related) focus. This theoretical view point is nec-
essary in order to make progress and change the world, although chang-
ing the world is often seen as a matter of practice. In the footsteps of F. 
Bacon’s writings on the nature of science and the scientific method, 
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where he shared his views of the unity of knowledge, both scientific and 
non-scientific (including philosophical/ethical), we find three important 
insights on the overall relation of ethics with research and education, 
which was understood as a great potential of change, not only for sci-
ence but as an ideal inclusivity rooted education.  
Building knowledge and thus augmenting it, grounding knowledge 
on a solid methodological ground, developing an argument in order to 
communicate knowledge: all the complicated aspects of truth and justi-
fied belief formation and communication are central aspects of an ethics 
of change for three reasons, that have been found in the parallel devel-
opment of scientific research and good practice oriented education poli-
cy.  
In order to avoid error and not to suspend the process of progress in 
knowledge and good practice: (1) the delivery of knowledge, which is 
often magisterial and peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful in edu-
cation institutions, should be perfected and amended. (2)  An early and 
peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods, from which 
research and education receive small or no augmentation, should be lim-
ited. We need to keep the original creative activity of the researcher as 
energia in focus: “knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, 
it is in growth; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it 
may, perchance, be further polished, and illustrate and accommodated 
for use and practice, but it increases no more in bulk and substance351.” 
(3) If science is not increased, it is unlikely that decent conditions of 
research and education can be further looked for, clearly established and 
reaffirmed when good practice is not respected. Lack of augmentation of 
knowledge, research and education output is a risk for the research and 
                                                          
351 Bacon, Francis (1893) The Advancement of Learning, London: Cassell & 
Company, §V, 4, 9. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) is a leading figures in epistemo-
logical philosophy and scientific methodology just after in the Renaissance era; 
not to confound with the 20th Century Irish painter and homonym. 
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education profession: “the most constant and devoted kind of professors 
of any science ought to propound to them-selves to make some additions 
to their science”, they should not convert their labours “to aspire to cer-
tain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or commenters, to be a 
sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or abridg-
er”. Quality of knowledge should be improved, but also the quantity 
augmented, because change in praxis depends not only on the consolida-
tion of knowledge but on knowledge formation itself352. Of course 
knowledge formation and augmentation should not be overall consid-
ered as mandatory or vital for a majority of the homo sapiens family, as 
life has many circumstances which don’t depend on it; it is enough to 
inspect the socio-economic tissue of society at many levels, and across 
many useful professions, to see that some are indirectly very dependent 
on the progress in knowledge, not to mention the deep but sophisticated 
gap between scientific progress and technical innovation. 
Aiming at living with epistemic concern for truth is to philosophical-
ly question the value of prima facia knowledge, instead of denying 
knowledge in order to posit human practice dangerously close to might 
is right. Knowing what we eat, where we live, how we use common 
natural resources as water, food, how we take a medicine when we are 
ill, how aware we are of having a freedom of movement, how we man-
age to bring nature closer to our lives and to our relatives, all these sim-
ple aspects of life show the importance of having at hand the right 
knowledge, instead of relativizing the value of knowledge. The cultural 
framework of knowledge is important but should never be confounded 
with knowledge formation and the relevant criteria for truth and authen-
tic scientific discovery. Inclusive education on the contrary can be di-
rectly related to knowledge formation as it concerns the right under-
standing of a good practice, which should not exclude on the ground of 
the identity or of a particular handicap. 
                                                          
352 Bacon, §V, 10. 
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Inclusive education can be part of an ethical reformation of life, in-
cluding a fine understanding on how digital technology may bring some 
answers on how we change the world, as the same ingenuity was needed 
at other periods of History, related to the impact of other major technol-
ogies and scientific paradigm shifts. In conclusion it is not enough “to 
call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth” and to 
apply knowledge only to manners, good practices and research policies; 
both heaven and earth should “conspire and contribute to the use and 
benefit of man”, “to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruit-
ful; […] as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort”. Knowledge 
formation will always be the best ally of meaningful inclusion of weak 
parts of the human family, and of sustainable societal change, but the 
search for knowledge without self-knowledge is vain: “knowledge with-
out conscience is but the ruin of the soul [Science sans conscience n'est 
que ruine de l'âme]353” (Gargantua and Pantagruel by F. Rabelais, 1653). 
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